THE FUTURE OF HIZB-UT-TAHRIR IN BRITAIN

Noman Hanif

The release of Ed Husain’s book, “The Islamist” and its serialisation by the UK Daily Telegraph seems on the surface to be a coup’detat for British intelligence. A former insider from the seemingly “secretive” and “impenetrable” radical Islamic organisation, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party) has openly shared with the public the “inner” dynamics and thinking of this well known but little understood organisation. In the absence of a comparative what are we to make of this supposedly “insider” view. One must firstly give credit to HT in that since its launch in 1952, there exists no account of any member whether serving or disgruntled to have engaged in any efforts to expose or undermine its organisational structure or idea base individually or through co-operative measures with any state media and apparatus. Especially since Ed Husain himself points out that HT members are unique in their loyalty to an idea rather than the organisational structure and as the example of Mr Hussein himself suggests, intimidation or coercion etc is not a practice conducted by HT of former members and hence not a barrier to speaking openly. Ed Husain is probably the first and follows an increasing trend of former members of radical movements in the Western world turning super grass, the prominent ones being Hassan Butt from Muhajiroun (News of the World, May 25th, 2007) and jihadist Abu Qatada (Guardian 30th March, 2007).

Along with this, MI5’s success in recruiting Abu Qatada as a double agent (Guardian 30th March, 2007), Mohammed Aswat (linked to Abu Hamza and alleged 7/7 bombers) to infiltrate and spy on the jihadist network in the UK (Guardian 10th Feb, 2005) and possible courting of Al –Muhajiroun founder Omar Bakri Mohammed (who according to credible sources is currently under UK secret custody), would seem to vindicate the oft criticised policy of the UK government in fomenting radical movements on UK soil. If home advantage has been a clear positive for the UK intelligence services, it has been a critical vulnerability for the radical movements. Nevertheless, it would be safe to assume that there is very little the UK intelligence services would have gained from Ed Hussein’s insider view. Infiltration of HT in the UK would not have been difficult as it can be gauged from Ed Husain’s own account that HT and Muhajiroun had essentially an open door policy. One must also not overlook the fact that HT is not an alien concept for the UK. The party has been a subject of study for MI6 because of its core level of support in Jordan and the consistent level of activity in other areas of the Middle East for over five decades (Farouki, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Elusive Caliphate, Grey Seal, 1994). This point is even more poignant considering it was Britain directly through its ‘viceroy’ in Jordan, Glubb Pasha which resulted in HT being banned and refused registration as a political party in the country in 1953.

So questions arise as to why Mr. Hussein would break his own silence and attempt such a disclosure at this particular time? And whether there is anything of value from his narrative in considering the future of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Britain? In this essay I will argue that although Ed Hussain will undoubtedly be of some value to British intelligence in creating problems within the HT membership, very little can be gained from Ed Hussein’s narrow experience and scope in understanding the contemporary politics of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Britain (HTB) and the relationship with its global position. In turn I will demonstrate that contrary to Husein's assertion, HTB is not an extremist or radical organisation, rather one which has moved away from its ideological rigidity towards a cooperative pragmatism. This transformation has positioned the organisation within the framework of British politics in a manner that has become conducive to British interests. Hence, its proscription is both unnecessary and highly unlikely.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) or Liberation Party was formed in 1952 in Palestine by Taqiudine an Nabhani, an Islamic scholar, thinker and judge. Although HT started in Palestine it quickly spread throughout the Islamic world and beyond including Europe, Australia and Russia. Unlike the intellectual founders of other Islamic contemporary movements such as Hasan al Banna, Maududi and Sayid Qutb, Nabhani received special scholarly training in Islam from his reputable family and the Egyptian Al Azhar Islamic University. Nabhani perceived the existence of Western culture and colonialism as the reason for the continued decline and subjugation of the Islamic world. In consequence, he argued for a ‘liberation’ from this state of affairs through an intellectual struggle against Western culture and influence through building a popular base for Islamic revival and seizing the reins of power to establish Islamic authority in the form of a Caliphate. The contention was that the Islamic world had reverted to the period of ‘jahiliya’ (before Islam) and the only methodology to change this state of affairs was to emulate the political journey of the Prophet Mohammed in Arabia, from his development of a vanguard in Mecca to his establishment of an Islamic government in Medina. HT contends that this methodology explicitly rejects the reformism of the Muslim Brotherhood and the militarism of the jihadists’ in its quest to transform society and state. In its evaluation of Islamic history and contemporary politics, HT proclaims Britain, France, US and Russia as the perpetual enemies of Islam with whom there can be no contemporary engagement and with whom any future Caliphate is prohibited to conduct treatise. HT and its members became renowned for their resoluteness in adhering to the doctrine of rejecting co-existence with what it considered un-Islamic ideas, individuals, organisations and states. As a result HT was banned by most of the regimes in the Islamic world and continuously attacked by secular, nationalist and reformist organisations for its ideological rigidity. Although, its presence in the Western world has grown, its primary field of work remains the Islamic world. In the Western world, governments have been under intense pressure from the US and internally to ban HT because of what is regarded as its anti-Semitism and anti-democratic radicalist agenda. Germany has taken the lead in banning HT group activity but not its membership. The British government has so far resisted the calls for HT’s proscription.

Ed Hussein’s raison detaire as proclaimed in his book and interviews is to make us understand through his experience why young Muslims in Britain are becoming extremists. According to Husain, “Islamist groups pose a threat to this country that we –Muslims and non-Muslims alike- do not yet understand”. (Husein –The Islamist). He endeavours to help us understand the real causes of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism through his personal but brief experience of involvement with the trans-national radical group Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) or as it is known in Britain HTB. However, questions are raised in my mind as to the timing of Ed Husain’s book and the nature of his message, especially since the accuracy of his understanding of HT as an organisation would be compromised fifteen years after departure. With the “causes of radicalisation” having become the centre of gravity in terms of policy and research towards Muslim communities in the UK, further questions are raised in terms of opportunism. One of the reasons cited by Bob Beckley, lead spokesman on community policing and counter-terrorism issues for the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), for advising the Blair government not to proscribe HTB was that although “members are against terror” they “can provide an insight into why people might become radicalised.” Has Ed Hussein contributed towards this void now that he has purportedly challenged what Dean Goodson had insinuated in the Times, that even beyond the issue of proscription, “senior officers aver that Hizb- ut-Tahrir… plays a ‘stabilising role’ in certain areas.” As Madeleine Bunting responsively wrote,

“It helps that the book happened to come out last week, within a few days of the verdicts in the Crevice trial, Britain's longest running terror trial. Ed Husain, overnight, became one of the experts on what needs to be done to tackle home-grown terrorism.” (Guardian, 12th May, 2007).

As a researcher of Nabahani’s ideological and political thought I was quite startled with the superficial understanding and treatment of HT’s ideational base by Husein. Husein’s critique of Nabahani needs a fuller explanation which will have to be dealt with separately and at another time. However, some general points need to be addressed. From Husein’s own account it is evident that the first and only point of contact with the HT literature from within was under the leadership of Omar Bakri Mohammed, which according to reports inside and out, forms the most conceptually deviant period of HT’s existence in the UK, diverting quite sharply away from its core ideas. According to Husein’s own narrative, virtually all of his conceptual interaction under this period was of a secondary nature from equally uninformed members and with demonstrable ignorance in understanding the basis of Nabahani’s thinking towards matters relating to Sharia and Western thought. From these conceptual inaccuracies, Husein’s ‘second reading’ of Nabahani which is from the outside, further compounds the fog when he takes as his standard of interpretation a new found perspective in the form of Western thought. By doing so he is unable to comment on the vast and detailed understandings of classical Islam given by Nabahani to justify the rejection of those areas of Western thought which are seen to conflict with the Islamic belief and those areas which are open to adoption. Husein applies the lens of Plato, Hegel, Gramsci, Rousaeu etc in order to interpret Nabahani without understanding that Nabahani had indeed echoed some similarity in their arguments and even adopted them (Nabahani never claimed to be the originator of these ideas), while at the same time where and why he differed from them on basic conceptions and definitions of realities were clearly laid out. In consequence, Husein comes to a ludicrous conclusion which is evident to anyone familiar with Nabhani’s work in stating:

“It seems to me that Nabhani is a product of Rousseau”. (Husein, The Islamist, p162)

Husein’s critical agenda becomes even more questionable when he attempts incorrectly to undermine the position and value of the Caliphate within classical Islamic literature from a selective reading of Sufi Islam. It was ironic that HTB representative Taji Mustafa had to correctly point out that Husein had mislead even from the texts of Sufi Islam;

“he (Husein) argues that key orthodox political ideas such as the caliphate are alien to "traditional" Islam.., one of the scholars who Husain cites as a new found reference point is the respected Sufi Shaykh Nuh Keller. In his translation of the classical jurisprudential work Reliance of the Traveller he states that the caliphate is "obligatory in itself" and an integral part of orthodox Islamic thinking. There are many examples of Muslim scholars and thinkers more famed for their spiritualism who endorse the ideas of Shariah and caliphate as inherently part of Islam. Husain has chosen to ignore the opinions of these Sufis who agree with those he labels Islamists” (The Islamist Bogeyman, Guardian 14th May 2007)

HT’s ideology and methodology to re-instate Islam is quite unique in that it is radical yet non-violent. A concept, governments’ in the Islamic and Western world have found difficult to deal with. Although, it is banned in most countries in the Islamic world due to its non-recognition of what it considers non-Islamic and hence illegitimate regimes, it has maintained a unique structural discipline in its adherence to its non-violent methodology. Frustrated with efforts to combat HT’s political strategy, governments such as in Jordan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan have attempted but failed to bring terrorism charges against the group. For this reason, it is not Hussein's sentiment towards terrorism but his attempted link between HT, extremism and terrorism that needs proper scrutiny. Indeed, Husain’s constructed linkage is not new. He follows the same logic of Zeyno Baran from the US Hudson Institute and Nixon Center who first termed HT as the “conveyor belt of terrorism”. Zeyno Baran in her article for the US journal Foreign Affairs entitled the War of Ideas described HT as the “greatest threat to Western security”. Although Baran’s declaration of HT as a terrorist organisation lacks any factual premise, her association with US energy companies and Central Asian dictatorships hostile to HT cannot be discounted as a major factor in her extreme attempt to bring HT under the rubric of the war on terror. Moreover, Baran’s and by default Ed Husain’s enterprise is comprehensively dismantled by former Swiss civil servant and historian, Jean-Francois in his research paper entitled “Hizbut Tahrir--The Next al-Qaeda, Really?” and by the suspicious fact that neither Baran or Hussein draw upon the only established research on HT by Exeter university academic Suha Taji Farouki, which categorically discounts their logic.

Similarly, with recognition in Western circles that the War of Ideas against resurgent Islam is being lost, I do not consider it mere coincidence that Ed Husain’s exposure can be divorced from the focus by Western governments on combating radical Islam by co-opting and promoting elements in the Muslim world from the Sufi and secular persuasion. Think tanks especially in the US which have graduated from the war of ideas against Communism under the Cold War paradigm have been awash with policy initiatives to combat radical Islam under the same framework, the latest being the RAND corporations report entitled, “Building Moderate Networks”. (www.rand.org) Madeleine Bunting in her interview with Ed Hussein reveals that his conversion to secularism coupled with his Sufi inclination seems to fit quite neatly with this equation.

“There has never been much love lost between Sufism and Islamism - the former criticised as politically quiescent - and one way to read Husain is that Sufi Islam now has a sympathetic hearing in Whitehall and the media, and has the confidence to challenge Islamist domination of the UK Muslim community”(Guardian, 12th May, 2007).

However, the key question remains, how do we qualify the accuracy and quality of Ed Hussein’s account and explanation?

The only official narrative available on HT is the research of Dr, Suha Taji Farouki detailed in her book, A Fundamental Quest- Hizb-al Tahrir and the Islamic Caliphate. Although Farouki was not an insider, it is clear from the comparison that her understanding of HT thought and level of organisational access was far higher and superior than that of Ed Husein. Unlike Farouki, Ed Hussein had no experience of HT in the Arab world and no access to understanding the ideas outside of the British box. It can be very easily ascertained that Ed Husein was in fact a very low level foot soldier whose organisational access was regionally restricted and who alongside many of the young hot-blooded recruits of that period had no real appreciation of the complexity of HT’s ideological thought and global strategy. It cannot be over-stated that HT is not a Western phenomena. Its membership and area of activity remains firmly rooted in the Islamic world. HT in Europe is largely a post 1980’s occurrence and as Farouki points out within its own framework of importance a rather irrelevant and tangential one at that.

“It is likely that the Party will continue to attract disaffected young Muslims in Britain. The importance of such success to its over-all objective of establishing an Islamic state in a Muslim (Arab) country is questionable, however. Conversely, so is the relevancy of its agenda, conceived for a Muslim context, yet exported lock, stock and barrel to the context of minority Islam in a secular Western state. Its strategy revolves around preparing society in a location that constitutes a suitable potential home for the Caliphate. The fruit of the struggle of ideas in a particular location, and the process of interaction of which it is part, can only be realised only through a process of consolidation having at its end product the erection of the Caliphate. Such consolidation must assume as its focus a location, within the party’s sphere of activity, which strictly speaking does not encompass Western countries. These remain peripheral to the Party’s primary area of concern”. (Taji Farouki, p187)

Herein lies the crux of situating Ed Husein’s exposé. Suha Taji situates her critique at the time of Ed Husain’s activity in HT. This period was an extreme anomaly for HT as it deviated radically from its stated thought and methodology via its targeting of British society under the regional leadership of Omar Bakri Mohammed. HT’s subsequent removal of Omar Bakri for this deviation drew an abrupt end to this short period of anarchy. Omar Bakri subsequently went onto continue his programme through the establishment of Muhajiroun. The refocusing of HT in Britain, re-branded as HTB bears very little resemblance to that period. One of the spokesmen for HT, Taji Mustafa, in responding to Ed Husain was categorical on this point.

“The book is a personal recollection from over 10 years ago. Leaving aside the many flaws and inaccuracies, it claims to be an account of Hizb ut-Tahrir [the Party of Liberation] under a brief period of aberrant leadership, which was recognised at the time. That is why Omar Bakri Mohammed was expelled from Hizb ut-Tahrir. Husain's brief association also ended, and the group, as many others will testify, moved on.”(Guardian, 14th May 2007)

The truth is however that HTB has moved from one aberration to another. In fact one could say that HTB has moved radically to the other end of the Islamic spectrum. Today, one would find it very difficult to identify HTB from what are recognised as the moderates. Unwilling to face proscription and even extinction resulting from some of its core positions, it has attempted to present a more acceptable face to the British government and society. More specifically, HTB has gone to extra-ordinary lengths in order to gain legitimacy from the British establishment. In doing so it has deviated considerably from its position of non-cooperation and co-existence with what it considered as non-Islamic concepts and entities. Despite its long standing opposition to co-operation with stated deviant Islamic organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), the Islamic Human Rights Commission etc, HT has shared platforms with them, even participating in the signing of collective petitions, the text of which would have been originally termed as un-Islamic and groups such as the MAB, MCB, ISB etc considered as too close to the British establishment and consequently acting as their agents.

The most subtle but monumental change has been the use of language, which fundamentally alters the meaning of its basic political position and concepts. For instance HTB was signatory to a petition organised by Muslim and non-Muslim organisations and individuals pertaining to the anti-terror laws entitled “United to Protect Our Rights”. Despite HTB’s official rejection of non-Divine laws (Kufr), it accepted the text of the petition despite one of the sections calling for “The Amendment or Repeal of the Human Rights Act”. According to the text of the petition;

“We the undersigned have not forgotten the experiences of the conflict in Northern Ireland and the lessons of the last 30 years when the removal of fundamental rights and the creation of an entire suspect community achieved nothing other than the continuation of violence, fear, bitterness and the creation of an unbridgeable divide. We call on the government to protect all of the people by advocating a proper and judicious use of the existing law and by realising that over-reaction will be deeply counterproductive.”(hizb.org.uk)


This petition and others like it signal a new pragmatism amongst its membership for this petition and others like it bear their individual signature. It reflects a monumental change in the basic framework within which the HT member is developed. The grooming of its members is expected to produce uncompromising leaders in society. The shift from resoluteness irrespective of popularity to pragmatism in order to gain acceptability challenges the very essence of what HTB states is the characteristic of its members:

“A leader does not lie to or flatter people; he leads and refuses to be led, and influences instead of being influenced. We tell people whatever is true and correct regardless of whether they like it: we appreciate that our approach is tough and that they may distance themselves from us for periods of time...” (Internal document, Farouki, p107)

The most explicit example of HTB’s own deviation from its renowned exclusiveness was displayed at a recent demonstration on May 26th 2007, in London organised as a protest against Pakistani General Parvez Musharraf. HTB’s own expression was the standard need to establish the Caliphate. However, this was not the message given by the anti-Islamic, secular and nationalist parties with whom HTB chose to form an alliance and share a platform. Such political tactics and platform sharing were thus no different to that of the religious and political parties in Pakistan that HTB had criticised consistently in its own literature. More importantly, HTB sidestepped the issue of its fundamental political programme in the requirement for society to have deeply absorbed the Islamic thoughts and rejected non-Islam or (kufr). The irony here was that the groups they were supporting on the demonstration were the complete antithesis of this ideational requirement. One of the groups, the Benazir Bhutto led Pakistan Peoples Party had consistently its direct opposition to any notion of Sharia in Pakistan. Not to mention that HT rejects as against Sharia the notion of a woman being the leader of a state. HTB went even further and agreed a common declaration incorporating the demands of all the parties with a press release couched in conciliatory language with a unifying base premised on the least common denominator i.e. the removal of President Musharraf.

“All opposition parties from Pakistan, including the main political parties and key civil society figures unanimously sent a message to Musharraf that he must leave office immediately and make way for a new chapter in the future of Pakistan. The demonstration came about after a culmination of key discussions in the past week between opposition parties where it was agreed that a public demonstration of disapproval against Pakistan's Western dictator was urgently needed. Amongst the resolutions is an agreement that to co-operate with Musharraf in any way is treachery and a crime against the people…The other leaderships were appreciative of the gesture for sincere and open dialogue and warmly greeted the Hizb's central role in making the demonstration successful and for the first time bringing all of the Pakistani opposition together” (hizb.org.uk)

What was explicit here was a clear manifestation of bandwagoning on the influence of the secular and nationalist parties ensuing from HTB’s desperation at not being able to achieve any measurable partisan support in the UK and impatience with the lack of its own success in Pakistan. It is well understood that the Pakistani political parties have made it part of their established work to engage with Western governments in order to lobby and enlist their support for the achievement of their political objectives. In the context of HT’s ideas this is tantamount to a betrayal of the Muslim ummah (nation) yet the deviation was resounding, with no open criticism of the stance taken by the Pakistani political parties. In its pragmatism, HTB had effectively undermined its own opposition to ‘colonial’ assistance and legitimised the politics of these parties, hence moving away from their own books;
“The colonialists exploited the fact that their personality had become the focus of culture and attention in the political aspects. They made the seeking of foreign assistance, as well as dependence upon them, the focus of contemporary politicians, who viewed politics as a career, rather than a responsibility. Therefore, most of the groups attempted unconsciously to seek foreign help. Those who sought the assistance of foreign states did not realize that any such help, and advocating any idea of dependence upon the colonialists, regardless of their origin, would mean that they are contaminated by foreign poison, and it would constitute a betrayal to the Ummah, even if the intention was good. They did not realize that linking our cause with any other people would constitute political suicide. Therefore, any movement whose thought was poisoned with the idea of relying upon or advocating foreign assistance was doomed to failure.” (Party Structuring, p12)
Similarly, even on its core political issues, to avoid censure in the UK, HTB has gradually but consistently compromised and removed from its website and literature references to physical jihad and the destruction of Israel, a move which lowers its perception considerably amongst other Islamic organisations as a genuine radical outfit. More so, in order to avoid the charge of anti-Semitism, subtly, the language and context of its core rallying cry, the Israeli issue has been re-engineered from one of destruction of the state to that of “illegal” occupation, “state terrorism” as well as that of “Zionism” rather than the conventional language of a jihad against Jews (the original text of the verses of Koran and the traditions of Mohammed used by HTB to support the argument against Israel categorically referred to the term “Jews” not Zionism) even printing photographs of Hasidic Jews holding a HT banner on a demonstration against the state of Israel. The manifestation of this change of context and language is evident in two examples from HTB. The first from a leaflet issued in July 2006 in response to the Israeli attack on Lebanon entitled, “Israel's Massacre of Lebanon Marks a New Zenith in The ‘War on Terror’ “. In this leaflet, by moving the focus onto the context terrorism, HTB manoeuvred the subject matter away from the conventional position over the “illegitimacy” of the Israeli state and the call for its destruction via a jihad. What could be read from the text was not a problem with the existence of Israel but rather with its “terrorist” actions.

“Amongst those who seem unable to condemn Israel's terrorism are the rulers in the Muslim world, who are ever more distant from the views of their populations. While their populations demonstrate and call for action - cutting diplomatic ties, oil sanctions on supporters of Israel, and security for civilians - the rulers continue to support the ongoing bloodshed.”

Further evidence of its compromise in language over Israel is illustrated in HTB’s report entitled “Iraq: A New Way Forward”, which attempts to establish a number of rational steps required to solve the Iraq issue. In step 5, HTB endeavours to rationalise the issue of Israel and in consequence for the first time uses the term “annexation” to describe the 1948 scenario. Recognising a priori legitimacy and existence of Israeli existence for “annexation” to occur and then inferring a concept of “illegality” from the Western perspective. All notions of Israel’s destruction were again carefully avoided:

“In the context of ensuring long term stability to the region, Israel's annexation of Palestine in 1948 should not be recognised…. Until it is recognised that the annexation of Palestinian land in 1948 was not just illegal but heralded the ethnic destruction of lives, property and lands of millions of Palestinians, the so-called imposed 'peace process' will not work and instability in the region will remain. If the Zionist regime that governs in Tel Aviv has a right to Palestine, a region it annexed in 1948, then Argentina had a right to invade the Falkland Islands in 1982. Yet Britain sent an armada of naval ships across the globe to reassert British sovereignty. Today Palestinians are asked to recognise this illegal annexation.” (HTB Iraq: A New Way Forward)

The most dramatic engagement however has been with Western institutions, organisations and notably with the British political establishment. One cannot overstate the significance of these departures for they break with the very essence of its political understanding and strategy towards Britain as the “head of the snake” because of its considered long standing enmity towards Islam, practice of colonialism and responsible along with France for the destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate. The most noteworthy engagement was when HTB responded to an invitation from Claire Short to address politicians at Westminster on March 3, 2006, as to why it should not be proscribed. This was indeed a monumental step for HT. For the conventional position of HT globally was of a state of aggression with Britain, France and the US. Under this position, the only conceivable engagement was either ‘jihad’ on the battlefield or an invitation to Islam. Neither of these formed the basis of exchange at Westminster. Moreover, HTB in uncharacteristic fashion underplayed the meeting on their website with a virtual information blackout. The pertinent details could only be ascertained from a blogger, Harry’s Blog who was present at the meeting. What was conveyed can only be described as analogous to a scenario of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuiness being interrogated by British Parliamentarians and pleading for their sympathy for Republicanism. The Parliamentarians were expected by the HTB delegates to find some cause of endearment for HTB and its goal of an Islamic Caliphate. For only this could explain why a copy of the HT Draft Islamic Constitution was given out to the attendees instead of the conventionally understood discussion on the Islamic doctrine itself. Imran Waheed and Jamal Harwood were effectively courting the British establishment which was reciprocated by Claire Short. According to the account:

“Clare Short hosted Hizb ut-Tahrir for a meeting in the Houses of Parliament. The meeting was supposed to give Parliamentarians an opportunity to quiz Hizb ut-Tahrir before the attempt by the Prime Minister to have the organization proscribed. The meeting began rather tellingly with Clare Short refusing impolitely the request by the Jewish Chronicle to take photos of herself with either of the two representatives of HuT. At the meeting were around a dozen parliamentarians from both houses, including some heavyweight figures such as Lord Lawson and Lord Avebury. To open, a document was distributed with an open letter to Clare Short from Lord Avebury, the letter Peter Tatchell wrote and an article from the
Bangladeshi Daily Star, entitled, ‘The long history of violence behind Hizb ut-Tahrir’. The two representatives of HuT, Imran Waheed and Jamal Harwood (a white, middle-class ‘city accountant’ – poor sod) sat facing their would-be interrogators. Imran Waheed dressed in a sharp suit with an open collar and proceeded to give a well-rehearsed autobiographical outline of his life that made Richard Curtis seem like a working-class rebel. Waheed went to the top grammar school in the country (where, rather surprisingly he found HuT), after university he joined the NHS to become a psychiatrist. The subtext; I am a proud British Muslim, I have a good living, I have children, I am the very embodiment of middle-class values, I listen to Radio 4 – how could I be a threat? In-between predictable jokes about The Sun, bonhomie about Birmingham being ‘the centre of the world’, and his anger at the injustices in the Middle-East, Waheed managed to create a discourse of mutual dialogue between Islam and the West that seemed respectable and reasonable. The story climaxed with Waheed explaining to his audience that many Hizb ut-Tahrir members were out on the streets on 7/7 helping the victims of the terrorist atrocity.” (http://hurryupharry.bloghouse.net/archives/2006/03/03/short_on_debate.php)

This is far from the extremist image of HTB, experienced and portrayed by Ed Husain. In an interview for radio 5 on the 16th of May 2007, Husain had to concede that in comparison to its break off faction, HTB was “liberal” and then contradicted himself by maintaining his call for its proscription on the basis that HTB was instrumental in radicalising Muslim youth in Britain. Clearly, Husain’s knowledge is ossified in the Omar Bakri era. Fifteen years on and the hot-headed young university firebrands have evolved from the Omar Bakri diversion. Most of the HTB leadership now consists of middle aged professionals interested in emulating Western political styles. HTB has evolved into a totally unrecognisable animal. Obstacles to its proscription are clearly manifest from within the British establishment. Where Western intelligence failed in the Middle East to penetrate or influence HT, it may have succeeded in doing so in Britain. HTB is clearly playing ball. In its quest for state legitimacy, the guiding hand of the establishment is firmly on it. Indeed even if this is not directly the case, HTB has done itself no favours in terms of its image with other radical organisations and the deeply suspicious and conspiratorial Muslim world at large. The crude manifestation of this image and HTB’s ideological departure was evident in the recent debate organised by the exclusive and establishment influenced Oxford Union, where despite protestations, interestingly but not surprisingly Jamal Harwood was given a platform. A transcript of the speech was pasted on HTB’s website. In a debate entitled ‘This House Regrets the Founding of the United States of America', Harwood broke the mould and lay praise on the political thinkers of the US as well as its statesmen. But, the most fundamental shift occurred when Harwood avoided addressing the secular doctrine and instead focussed on the more specific idea of “individualism”. Again like the meeting in Westminster, the invitation to Islam was notably absent. In a speech indicative of an address by Iran’s reformist former President Khatami to the United States; Harwood endorsed the concept of self-determination and explicitly moved away from the established position of Islam’s universality towards an implicit notion of co-existence. Was this an implied recognition of democracy by the openly pronounced “Chairman” of the executive committee of HTB?

“This debate is not about choosing between Caliphate and California as claimed by Matt Frei (opposite) the choice is about the right of peoples to choose their own way of life without US interference or continued US oppression. You have an opportunity today to give a resounding message against what the US has become… It is a sad irony that despite the ideals promoted by the founding fathers, America has proceeded in the world emulating the approach of European colonialism.” (hizb.org.uk)

There is no doubt a duality in HTB’s persona. Its appearance on the Sharia, Caliphate and Western adventurism in the Islamic world is indeed couched in radical language. But as I have demonstrated above, there has also emerged a very subtle dynamic which has aimed to neutralise the radicalism. It would be folly to argue that HTB’s approach in the UK was not sanctioned by its central leadership. The unorthodox direction of the British branch is consistent with some its leaderships own diversions. On the 1st of January 2004, the HT central leadership addressed an open letter to the French government. Such an address to a Western government was unprecedented in HT’s history. Citing the issue of the French proposal to ban the wearing of the hijab and other religious symbols in schools, the plea to overturn the decision was based on two stated points:

“Firstly: 480 years ago in the sixteenth century, we, the Muslims, undertook an act of goodwill towards France. Secondly: Historically, France has a tradition of chivalry and reciprocating acts of goodwill.” (An Open letter from Hizb ut-Tahrir to President Chirac, President of the Republic of France)

HT’s central leadership without precedent acted in the capacity of a Caliphate and overlooked the explicit state-of-war as outlined in its own draft constitution based on France’s exploits in the Islamic world post sixteenth century. The delegation sent to deliver the letter to the French President was from HTB. It was this same delegation comprising the standard Imran Waheed and Jamal Harwood that were utilised to approach other Western institutions and NGO’s in order to seek a change in their policy over the brutality of the Central Asian governments towards their members. The conventional conceptual and political assessment of HT is to view Western NGO’s with suspicion considering them extensions of the policy of Western governments and by default agents not to be trusted. As for official government forums especially Western forums such as the OSCE, EU etc, are by their very nature considered hostile towards Islam and the Muslims. It would accordingly be betrayal to the cause to approach these Western organisations for any kind of assistance or exposure. Yet such a position was indeed adopted by its central leadership in its various leaflets addressing Western and other humanitarian organisations working in Central Asia and specifically in Uzbekistan where the government has brutally tortured and intimidated HT members. This pragmatism had broken rank with its history in the Middle East where HT consistently refused to call upon any NGO or Western influenced intervention despite the most ferocious onslaughts on its members by local regimes. Using the example of its central leadership, on November, 2006, a delegation from HTB, having been denied a hearing by the OSCE on Central Asia, finally got to meet Bertrand de Crombrugghe, the Chairman of the OSCE Permanent Council and Head of the permanent delegation of Belgium to the OSCE, in Vienna. HT was explicitly regarded by the members of the OSCE as a threat to its security in Central Asia and it was no stranger to the reports by various NGOs’ over the treatment of HT members. The fact that the OSCE had not acted despite its understanding of the situation did not deter the HTB delegation. The delegation was clearly looking for support and assistance from its declared enemies. According to its own press release on the meeting;

"The delegation updated the Ambassador on the deteriorating situation in Central Asia, where peaceful political dissent has become a justification for torture, arbitrary detention and even extrajudicial killing. The Ambassador was reminded that previous OSCE meetings have heard how thousands of members of Hizb ut-Tahrir have been incarcerated in Central Asia for political dissent…The death of several Hizb ut-Tahrir members in custody in suspicious circumstances have also been widely commented on at OSCE meetings." (hizb.org.uk)

From these examples it can be ascertained to a certain extent that the notion implied by some that HTB is an aberration from its central leadership is not strictly true. The departure from conventional positions runs through the chain. Having refused consistently to challenge its proscription in the Middle East through the system and the courts which it describes as un-Islamic and hence illegitimate, HTB has again broken the mould in the UK, with the explicit acquiescence of its central leadership. In an interview with the Jamestown Foundation, HTB member Taji Mustafa avoided answering the question as to the possible extinction of its organisational structure as a result of its possible proscription. Instead, he confirmed HTB’s commitment to fight such a move through the UK courts:

“We will fight proscription through the courts and people should not forget that we have a very strong case.” (Jamestown Foundation, Feb 13th 2007)

Although HTB has never given an open and clear Islamic justification as to why it has been allowed to approach the UK court system in order to fight its proscription, there is a clear departure from its political understanding on the matter which regards the judiciary as an inseparable arm of the executive in those cases which are politically sensitive and involve national security. Thus, according to its own political paradigm, any recourse by HTB to the courts would entangle it in a political not judicial process or outcome.

From the above examples, there is an argument to suggest that the consistent departure by HTB from its conventional principles forms the backbone of disagreement between the various British institutions regarding its proscription. For if there is benefit in HTB to the UK government, proscribing it would ultimately lead to its extinction for it thrives solely on the freedom of activity to keep its membership functional. Despite its own internal memos highlighting the futility of demonstrations, members’ anger and frustration has been channelled away from the lack of purpose and reason for its continued existence in the Western world towards its own failure in the Islamic world.

This of course bodes well for the UK intelligence services. HT’s stated pride in not having been infiltrated by Western intelligence would no doubt have been severely tested on British soil. Indeed the evidence seems to point exactly in that direction. Abu Qatada, Mohammed Aswat and Hassan Butt have demonstrated the benefits to the British intelligence services of having home advantage. In this regard HT’s liason with OBM seems to have been a critical one. Many analysts have questioned the relationship between UK intelligence and OBM, particularly because of the impunity with which he operated in the UK and secondly the convenient manner in which he left the UK for Lebanon whilst maintaining his contact and influence with Al-Muhajiroun fronts such as Al-Ghuraba. OBM’s startling disclosure in an interview to the Jamestown Foundation that he had established al-Muhajiroun as a shadowy parallel structure in Saudi Arabia in 1993 without the knowledge of the HT leadership is the strongest pointer that he may have been himself implanted by British intelligence (www.jamestown.org, March 23rd 2004). The reason for this is the discrepancy in OBM’s story highlighted by the concealment of Al Muhajiroun’s set up even to HT members and foremostly the revelations of former US Justice Department prosecutor John Loftus who stated in a live interview with Fox News that along with Mohammed Aswat and Abu Hamza, Omar Bakri had been recruited by MI6 in the mid 90’s (around the time of him taking HT leadership in the UK) to draft up British Muslim’s to fight in Kosova. However it was John Loftus’s off-camera remarks in the same interview which present the gravest doubt on OBM’s story that Al-Muhajiroun had been established in Saudi Arabia;

“We arrested the New York branch of Al-Muhajiroun two years ago…The rest of the group is under surveillance. But the US was used by Al-Muhajiroun for training of people to send to Kosova. What ties all these cells together was, back in the late 1990’s, the leaders all worked for British intelligence in Kosova. Believe it or not, British intelligence actually hired some Al-Qaeda guys to help defend the Muslim rights in Albania and in Kosova. That’s when Al-Muhajiroun got started..The CIA was funding the operation to defend the Muslims. British intelligence was doing the hiring and recruiting. Now we have a lot of detail on this because Captain Hook, the head of Al-Muhajiroun, he sidekick was Bakri Mohammed, another cleric. And back on October 16, 2001, he gave a detailed interview with al-Sharq al-Aswat, an Arabic newspaper in London, describing the relationship between British intelligence and the operations in Kosovo and Al-Muhajiroun. So that's how we get all these guys connected. It started in Kosovo..” (Fox News, July 27th, 2005)

What seems to transpire is that OBM’s abdication seems to fit in with John Loftus’s key revelations that the British intelligence had been protecting their assets such as Mohammed Aswat and Abu Hamza from domestic and especially US law enforcement authorities. Nafeez Ahmed, Sussex University academic and researcher on the role of British intelligence in the War on Terror argues that despite the evidence of various terrorist plotters links with OBM, the official reluctance to act against Bakri and his active associates in the UK does not match the governments willingness to act pre-emptively to foil various terrorist plans. Instead:

“The MI6 connection raises questions about Bakri’s relationship with British authorities today. Exiled to Lebanon and outside British jurisdiction, he is effectively immune to prosecution” (Raw Story, 18th Sept 2006)

OBM’s influence and even leadership over people such as Abu Hamza and Saudi dissident Mohammed al-Masaari gives an indication as to his importance amongst the followers of jihadism and thus his potential as an intelligence asset. More importantly, OBM’s interview with Jamestown clearly suggests that he had high level access throughout HT’s global chain. His six year reign as HT leader in Britain, would have provided British intelligence ample opportunity to have deeply and widely penetrated the organisation. Whether and to what extent HT’s central leadership has been affected or infiltrated from the UK is a difficult question in point and one which at this point is unanswerable. Although, success in the currently engaged local HTB set up is a foregone conclusion. But, HT is not Muhajiroun. It is not a jihadist outfit and shuns violent action and terrorism. Yet, as has been shown in the case of the jihadists and Muhajiroun, there have been and remain potential policy uses for Islamist movements by Western intelligence. Moreover, there is a lot of suspicion from governments in the Islamic world that Britain is recruiting from HT as well as Muhajiroun and using its members to further its policy interests in places like Pakistan and Bangladesh. Hassan Butt’s work in assisting the establishment of Al- Muhajiroun in Pakistan is a case in point.

For this reason, HT’s non-proscription in the UK is more than just a homeland issue. Despite its own irrelevance in the UK, HTB forms an integral part of the wider foreign policy picture for the UK. In spite of Ed Husain's very superficial attempt to address HT ideology, it remains the only Islamic organisation to have detailed a complete programme and constitution for the running of an Islamic state and society. The notion of the Caliphate has indeed permeated the vocabulary of most of the Islamic movements in turn becoming widespread throughout the Islamic world. A fact that even HT’s most ardent critic, Zeyno Baran had to admit:

“HT's greatest achievement to date is that it has shifted the terms of debate within the Muslim world. Until a few years ago, most Islamist groups considered the notion of establishing a new caliphate a utopian goal. Now, an increasing number of people consider it a serious objective. And after decades of stressing the existence and unity of a global Islamic community (umma), HT can take pride in the growing feeling among Muslims that their primary identity stems from, and their primary loyalty is owed to, their religion rather than their race, ethnicity, or nationality.”(Baran, Foreign Affairs, 2005)

This point has become more acute with the RAND report highlighting the failure of the West over the war of ideas in the Arab world. No doubt, Western adventurism in Iraq has dealt a severe blow to the democratic project. In consequence, the appeal of Islam is fast on the ascendancy. HT remains the only group capable of filling that vacuum. Here lies the likely importance of HT in Britain’s global calculation. The revival of a failed Cold War model by the West to create a puppet Communist China through Hang-Kai Chek cannot be discounted. The gaming of a potential Sunni Caliphate with a Shia Iran has been an established scenario in contemporary security discourse. The acute focus in the speeches of US and UK political leaderships on the ‘Caliphate’ bears testimony to the increased recognition of the term in radical Islamist literature since 9/11. There is a sense of déjavous here. Having been condemned to the dustbin of history for the past eighty years, the Caliphate as an issue has been remarkable in its political comeback. It was the British foreign secretary, Lord Curzon who stated in 1924;

"the point at issue is that Turkey has been destroyed and shall never rise again, because we have destroyed her spiritual power: the Caliphate and Islam.”

And it was British Home Minister, Charles Clarke who declared in 2005;

“…there can be no negotiation about the re-creation of the Caliphate; there can be no negotiation about the imposition of Sharia (Islamic) law...”

Yet despite this ideological resistance, the Western alliance or even its individual members would have gamed for the ultimate series of events to occur in the Islamic world i.e. the collapse of unpopular regimes and the declaration of a trans-national Caliphate. Britain in contrast to the US stands with the experience of history on its side having precipitated the Arab revolt and other insurgencies in order to bring down the Ottoman Caliphate; the Eastern Question and Sykes-Picot are the lasting legacies of this policy. Ironically, there is also precedent in British policy for the idea of pre-emption. In 1915, fearing the backlash of sentiment in planning the post Ottoman period, Britain toyed with the idea of a pliant Arab Caliphate as a replacement for the inevitable collapse of the Ottoman version. According to the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, a series of ten letters between the British High Commissioner of Egypt and its Arabist client Hussein Ibn Ali of Mecca, Britain was promised support for an Arab revolt in return for leadership of an Islamic Arab Caliphate. Bearing the Cold War model in mind, such planning is not altogether in the realm of impossibility. More succinctly, HT would have to form the central pivot in such an audacious move, as HT is without contest renowned as the forerunner of the Caliphate. However, a cursory understanding of the contemporary frustration and anger in the Islamic world, as well as the religious connotation of a Caliphate would no doubt have the potential to take on a momentum of its own such as what happened in China in 1949 when the pro-American elements of the Communist Party in China were executed and Hang Kai Chek was chased out making way for a powerful and independent Communist leadership under Chairman Mao tse Tung. Could such a pre-emptive plan to establish a paper Islamic Caliphate be on the British cards? Interestingly there has been quite considerable activity at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) on such an issue. Only recently the FCO organised a closed door meeting inviting experts on HT and radical Islam to discuss the topic “The Future of the Caliphate”. One can only speculate that such events are not organised in a conceptual or policy vacuum.

Under such a paradigm, HTB would be an enormous asset to British foreign policy if effective infiltration, ideological degradation and engagement were achieved. Even in the event of an independent Caliphate being established, access on home soil to one of the main movements which would either support or even form the leadership of such an entity would no doubt be an asset. Such a position is also recognised by its own membership. According an account by Ed Husain:

“We were also concerned about Omar’s (Omar Bakri Mohammed) application for political asylum. I worried that the Hizb’s high profile in Britain might jeopardise the chances of him staying in Britain. I raised this with Bernie (member) too. ‘Oh no’, he said, ‘On the contrary’. ‘The British are like snakes; they manoeuvre carefully. They need Omar in Britain. More likely, Omar will be the ambassador for the khilafah here or leave to reside in the Islamic state. The kuffar know that – allowing Omar to stay in Britain will give them a good start, a diplomatic advantage, when they have to deal with the Islamic state. Having Omar serves them well for the future. MI5 knows exactly what were doing, what were about, and yet they have in effect, given us the green light to operate in Britain.” (Ed Husain, The Islamist, p116)

Paradoxically, since Omar Bakri Mohammed’s (OBM) departure from HTB, he has been viewed with increasing suspicion by HT members themselves. The burning question remains as to whether OBM was an MI5 plant. The use by British intelligence of OBM’s al-Muhajiroun organisation to assist policy in the Balkan’s conflict has already been highlighted above and by former British cabinet Minister Michael Meacher who wrote:

“During an interview on Fox TV this summer, the former US federal prosecutor John Loftus reported that the British intelligence had used the al-Muhajiroun group...to recruit Islamist militants with British passports for the war against the Serbs in Kosovo…The now disbanded al-Muhajiroun group held meetings in Manchester after 9/11 praising the courage of the suicide bombers and claimed to be helping UK Muslims to fight US troops in Afghanistan.” (The Asian News, October 2005)

Based on some of the evidence presented, it would be very naïve to suggest that OBM himself was not aware of Muhajiroun’s use by the intelligence services. OBM’s consistent transformation from political ideologue to jihadism would no doubt have raised further questions in the minds of HT members and others including the manner of his departure to Lebanon and most suspiciously his recent secret entry and detainment in the UK. If in fact OBM was an intelligence plant inside HT, then the manner in which he departed from HTB (which according to HT spokesman Taji Mustafa was expulsion but according to OBM was voluntary), would indicate firstly a heavy environment of suspicion under which his situation had become untenable, secondly, the priority of disclosing al-Muhajiroun in order to concentrate on jihad in the Balkan’s and/or thirdly, an internal disenchantment or struggle with the ideological exodus under OBM’s leadership. The green light in Britain for HTB to organise a conference on the Caliphate at Wembley stadium in 1994, despite many objections from governments in the Islamic world, raised many eyebrows even amongst its own members. It was at this time that suspicions started to flow as regards Britain’s intentions, HTB and OBM. Interestingly, even if one takes the argument that Britain was only interested in thwarting any future Caliphate, it is difficult to understand why HT’s central leadership would have allowed such a conference on British soil. This is because HT has proclaimed quite categorically its understanding of Britain’s historical role in infiltrating and thwarting key events aimed at mobilising support for the revival of the Caliphate. In its book ‘The Islamic State’, under a chapter entitled ‘Preventing the Reestablishment of the Islamic State’ HT asserts:

“…many steps were taken by the enemy, especially Britain, in order to quell any moves-whether directly or indirectly – aimed at reviving the Islamic state…al Hussein bin Ali was expelled from Hijaz and imprisoned in Cyprus as he had an eye on the Khilafah…the British through their collaborators, intervened to make sure that the Khilafah conference held in Cairo was called off and doomed to failure; and again in that same year, the British worked hard to dissolve the Khilafah associations established in India, making sure that the movements ambitions were aborted and its tendency was transformed into a nationalist and sectarian one”. (Nabhani, Islamic State, p216)

Despite this, the holding the Khilafah conference in the UK in 1994 was seen by HTB as a positive experience, especially its media representation throughout the Islamic world. However, the perceived effect of such conferences by HTB in developing, aiding and building a sound support base in the Islamic world is open to question. The evidence for this is that the high level of activity and media exposure in Britain has not been directly proportional to its influence in the key areas such as the Middle East. Rather, HT’s influence has waned considerably in those regions seen as crucial to its work. HT’s central leadership has looked to overcome its failure to build the popular base by relying on high profile media events which exaggerate its influence. The recognition of this failure and the concentration on seeking power without societal support base is aptly highlighted by a letter addressed to members by the former leader of HT globally, Abdul Qadeem Zaloom:

“…But the Ummah was overwhelmed by despondence and despair. She has lost hope in everything and lost confidence in everyone after they had deliberately placed her in certain conditions in order to make her reach saturation point so that she would lose her hope and attain a state of despair and submission, thus she would be easy to control and they could pass anything upon her, without her being able to lift a finger once her sensation became slothful and once she lost all hope and vigour. All of this affected the Shabab(member), for they on the-one hand look forward to the rise of the Khilafah, and their wait has become long, thus they started to think that seeking the Nussrah (material support) by the Party would spare them the burden of having to perform the other actions. On the other hand, they looked to the level that the Ummah had reached in terms of stagnation, indifference and despondence which have almost reached the point of despair, submission and loss of confidence and hope in everyone, and no matter how hard they attempt to move her, she would not respond nor react…” (HT internal document, undated)

Hence, despite its clearly stated shortcomings, HT continues to openly call for the armed forces in the Islamic world to overturn the regimes, sustaining a façade of readiness to its membership in order to maintain their confidence, loyalty and support. It is worth noting that according to HT methodology “seeking the support” forms part of what is termed the ‘interaction stage’ with society. In the literature of HT, seizing power is not a separate stage but a natural conclusion of popular uprising. The concept of a military coup was conceptualised by Nabhani as a style of support not a necessary outcome.(Nabhani, Party Structuring) However, one would be hard pushed to conclude this from the consistent exhortations addressing the armed forces which can be gauged by the following example;

“In your capacity as the effective force Islam obliges you to remove the existing rulers who govern according to the systems of unbelief…and to place us in power so we can establish the Caliphate…You possess the physical force which enables you to compel these rulers to do what Islam obliges.” (leaflet, Ma’dhira ila rabbina, Farouki, p104)

It is in this context that HTB is set up as a pivotal cog in this media manipulation. The example of Pakistan is a case in point where even before HT had announced itself in Pakistan, HTB had already moved its media circus and conducted a large conference entitled “Khilafah for Pakistan” aimed at supporting the virtually non-existent influence in that country and primarily calling for the armed forces to overthrow the military regime. In this regard HTB has become a beacon for other branches throughout the world. The local office in Indonesia has just announced the largest ever International Khilafah Conference in August 2007 to be held at the 100,000 capacity HGelora Bung Karno Stadium. In no manner does this reflect the relatively small influence of HT in the Islamic world’s most populous country. Not surprisingly Imran Waheed from the UK is listed as one of the key speakers, demonstrating the importance of the UK branch in terms of the conference projection. Without question, the holding of conferences by HT and their global media manipulation has become not only a substitute for developing a deep support base in society but a means to veil its shortcomings. In doing so HT has deviated sharply from the words of its own founder who warned that;

“…some colossal tasks have to be achieved before the existence of the State…desire and optimism would not therefore be sufficient for the State to rise, nor would hope and enthusiasm…every error in the analogy and every deviation from the path would result in a stumble and introduce sterility into the work. It therefore follows that ‘holding conferences’ on the issue of the Khilafah would not in itself lead to the establishment of the Islamic state…” (Nabhani, Islamic State, p238)

Two further issues arise from this proposed event. Firstly, the question of its allowance by the Indonesian government as it represents on paper a potential threat to its own constitution and state. Secondly, the position of US and Australia being key allies and neighbours, having defined HT as a vital threat to their interests as well as openly expressing concern over the increasing radicalisation of Indonesian society. If no real action is taken by the Indonesian government or pressure exerted by its Western allies, then one can credibly assume that a green light has been authorised for HT. In this case the game may be the same as that of Britain. Discussions with HT members’ have revealed suspicions about US plans to establish a pliant Caliphate in Central Asia, the objective being in their analysis, to cause enormous problems for Russia and even China in order to severely restrict their struggle with the US in international politics. It is unclear what they consider Britain’s position on this issue. Yet it cannot go unnoticed that HT in Britain is at the forefront of marketing globally the success of HT in Central Asia even though it does not target the region for the seizure of power. The idea being to capitalise on the enormous success of HT in the region for which Britain’s former ambassador to Uzbekistan Craig Murray has been openly co-opted due his perceived sincerity ensuing from his removal for criticising British policy. It is also notable that the media onslaught by HT on Central Asian governments has been unhindered by the UK government despite causing strains in their foreign relationships with the region and to the frustration of prominent US think tanks whose lobbyists such as Ariel Cohen and Zeyno Baran have labelled HT as the greatest threat to US interests in the region. HT members also maintain however that there is evidence to suggest the US may have backed away from such a move because of the possibility of uncontrollable consequences engulfing regions adjoining Central Asia such as the Middle East, Gulf and South Asia where Islamic radicalism has strong influence. It could be argued from this analysis that such concerns are minimised in the case of Indonesia due to its geographical proximity and weaker affiliation to radical Islam as identified by the RAND report, despite being the most populous Muslim country in the world. Given that the RAND report also argues for a return to Cold War strategy, the above example of the failed attempt by the US to develop a compliant China as a Communist counterweight against the Soviet Union post 1945 is a reminder that we may not be talking here merely in the realms of political speculation.

So what are the prospects of the UK government finding openings for engagement inside HTB? On the basis of the evidence so far, HTB’s move from ideological to pragmatic politics has indeed provided such an opportunity. Conventionally, the existence of a deep understanding of its core idea base amongst its members has been relied upon to form a self corrective in the event of conceptual departure. This process has however malfunctioned and even broken down, especially in the case of HT in Britain. A major reason for this is a consequence of Ed Husain’s narrative which demonstrates a radical degradation of the thought base of the HTB membership. The lowering of the bar for membership coupled with the excessive reliance on filling bodies for continuous activity rather than ideational leadership has punctured this mechanism. As highlighted above, the gradual but radical deviations lead by its senior members such as Imran Waheed and Jamal Harwood continues unchallenged. Ironically, HT member Taji Mustafa indicated above, that a challenge to OBM from the old guard and traditional ideologues seems to have been instrumental in his departure. However, the weakening of the ideological base under the current leadership seems to have penetrated deeply and widely. As a result any challenge to the pragmatic direction of the HTB leadership is unlikely to receive any measure of internal support. Instead resignations from frustrated and despondent ideologues is likely to increase. Under the current state of affairs there is a high likelihood of pragmatists replacing ideologues and dominating the key positions within the HTB structure. As long as the foot soldiers are kept busy with a high level of activity, the HTB leadership is unlikely to meet any serious challenge or redress.

In fact this state of affairs is somewhat confirmed by Ed Hussein himself as it transpires that he has come across some interesting information having become a darling of the UK intelligence. It was no wonder that Zia din Sardar in his review of The Islamist stated that it seems to have “originated from the mandarins in the Home Office”. In November 2006, on the DeenPort forum, Husain wrote,

"Even within HT in Britain today, there is a huge division between modernisers and more radical elements. The secret services are hopeful that the modernisers can tame the radicals. And hence the suspension of any ban. I foresee another split. And God knows best. I have said more than I should on this subject! Henceforth, my lips are sealed!"

This major division confirms what I have detailed above, what Hussein is targeting and upon which the security services are hoping and working for a split in the organisation. In a more recent thread, Husain writes of HT,

"Allah is opening a window of opportunity for their hidayah(salvation). There is a major development within HT that will lead many of the more thoughtful activists to reconsider their worldview and relationship with mainstream Islam and Muslims. Once news breaks within party ranks of what is happening within their leadership, some of the HT people will be receptive toward traditional Islam and may well leave their brand of radical Islamism."

Then on the same thread on 2nd May 2007, Husain writes, "Maajid Nawaz has left HT. And there are several others inside waiting to escape, but waiting for the right moment and reason. Don't ask me how I know. Until last weekend, Majid was a member of the Hizb's National Executive Committee in Britain. Some of you may remember him from the media coverage of his imprisonment and release from his four-year prison sentence in Egypt. Huge reverberations within HT as to why and who is else is next etc. Ideal moment to engage with HT people, particularly those on the Jalaludding Patel wing of the group."

Continuing with the theme of trying to foment divisions within HT, with respect to Majid Nawaz, Husain has claimed that Nawaz is linked to him and that Husain influenced Nawaz's decision to leave HT. In an interview with altmuslim.com, Husain says, "In this, I'm backed by Majid Nawaz who, recently left HT partly as a result of conversations we had about these issues, and more importantly, his exposure to traditional Islam in all its diversity. Soon, Majid will speak publicly and I ask HT members and others to listen and learn from Majid's wisdom, knowledge, and experience. Now the good news is that HT has proven in Britain that it can change and when pressure is applied it has changed. And I'm hopeful that this pressure that's on them now - exposing those core fascist values - that exposure will cause them to change those ideas and come on board the mainstream Muslim caravan."

In an interview with Husain by the New York Times, Husain said that Nawaz would soon go "public with the reasons for his departure, and explanation he hopes that will cause a stir like his own."

What this demonstrates is that despite the shortcomings of his book, Husain has been successful in updating his information base by penetrating HTB through his link with Nawaz and in turn becoming a useful weapon in the hands of the UK intelligence services. However, at the time of writing the reasons for Nawaz’s departure are not known. Moreover, it remains to be seen what will be the effect of Hussein's quite candid disclosures and whether there will be a change in his public posture which aims to maintain the pressure for proscription.

In conclusion, Ed Husein’s assessment of HT in Britain as an extremist outfit that needs to be proscribed does not match with the contemporary reality, a point Husein seems to be familiar with in private and most likely advocated by him as part of the pressure to help the “moderates“ take charge within HTB. The timing, tone, content and publicity of his book seems to be part of this broader game. Thus there is no real value in his book related to understanding the ideology and politics of HT as a global movement, precisely because he had the understanding or the access to produce such an evaluation. Rather it is a political move most likely engineered by the Home Office. Whatever the truth, the reality is that the tactics seem to be working on HTB. The current HTB leadership starting from Jalal ud Din Patel has moved literally, intellectual mountains in order to avoid the threat of proscription. The reason for this is because its proscription in the UK would effectively dismantle its policy of using the international media position of the UK for the purposes of maintaining a façade of global influence. Ironically, it is worth noting that since Omar Bakri Mohammed, HTB has come full circle, for according to HT members, Omar Bakri’s departure from HTB was a result of his refusal to accept the curtailing of media activity in the UK ensuing from his apparent sensitive disclosures to the Arabic magazine Al- Majallah in 1995. Although there was a clear recognition of harm from such a policy, no explanation seems to have been given by the current leadership even to its own members for this reversal, although it is quite evident that HTB’s survivalist response in order to maintain this position in the UK has once again become its own vulnerability. As such, there exists a demonstrably sharp contrast between the deviations of the HTB leadership and the confused but loyal foot soldiers that have been kept busy in securing an ill defined and tangential post-Caliphate scenario through the mobilisation of British Muslims. In this sense the UK government’s double edged sword of applying a mere ‘threat’ of proscription has worked quite effectively in gradually manoeuvring HTB into compromising situations whilst allowing its media circus to artificially inflate its influence.

HT’s existence on British soil along with its open door policy has given British intelligence unprecedented access and the potential to influence one of the most secretive, impenetrable and globally potent organisations in the world. In this sense HT’s presence in Britain is more of a threat to its own existence than to the security of the British state. Besides, HTB has demonstrated its usefulness for UK internal and external policy. It has already been suggested by senior police officers that HTB provides a stabilising effect in some areas. Moreover, unlike the ineffectual moderates, it not only speaks the same language as that of the identified extremists but at a higher and hence neutralising level. No doubt HTB has been successful in the radicalisation of a generation of Muslim’s in Britain. However, unlike renegade jihadists, they are peaceful and form no threat to the internal security of the state. Similarly, HTB’s attempts to affect British foreign policy through the use of open activity and the media has been largely cosmetic. Instead, the British government has benefited from HTB’s Muslim medium which on occasion converged with its own goals in highlighting problem areas such as in Central Asia and Africa etc.

Perhaps most controversially, as argued above, in the event of a pre-emptive plan in the Islamic world, HT would be central to British calculations and access to it from home soil via HTB essential. The good cop bad cop policy toward HTB by the British establishment has been very effective in regulating the direction of its leadership. HTB and its various fronts such as ‘New Civilisation’ have already enjoyed the hospitality of political Quangos such as the Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and other prominent platforms in the name of enlisting support from Western intellectuals for an Islamic state, an endeavour rendered fruitless in the absence of a belief in the Islamic doctrine and/or a functioning state model, not only by its own ideational base but also by that of other radical ideologues such as Sayid Qutb. Hence, notwithstanding the UK government wilting to domestic, US and European pressure to proscribe, HT’s British future seems secure. The paradox is that it is in the UK’s interest to maintain the status quo with HTB and build upon the window of engagement offered by Imran Waheed and Jamal Harwood to Claire Short and other Parliamentarians at Westminster. The question is whether it can be done without splintering the movement by way of internal backlash, a result which could see the disappearance of HTB from British soil.


Noman Hanif is Lecturer in Radical Islam and International Terrorism at Birkbeck, University of London. He is currently researching the thought and politics of Hizb-ut-Tahrir.